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THE ABORTION CASES:
A STUDY IN LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE
EVA REDFIELD RUBIN*
On January 22, 1973, the United States Supreme Court handed down
two decisions which overturned abortion laws in Texas and Georgia and
threw doubt on the constitutionality of similar laws in most of the other
states. Before the decision, abortion, unless performed under very ex-
ceptional circumstances, was an offense against the criminal law; now the
operation could be had legally throughout the United States. This dramatic
change had come through judicial decision rather than through legislative
action.
The Supreme Court which made this decision was largely a Nixon
Court-three Justices and the Chief Justice had been appointed by the
Republican President after an extensive search for conservative, non-
activist Justices. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, one of the Nixon appointees,
former counsel for the Mayo Foundation and an expert on medical law,
and former Court of Appeals Judge, wrote the majority opinion. Chief
Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., both appointed
by President Nixon, voted with the majority. The only Ntxon appointee
to dissent was Justice William H. Rehnquist; he was joined in dissent
by Kennedy appointee Byron R. White.
The decisions in Roe v. Wade' and Doe v. Bolton2 ended a decade of
clamor for reform of state abortion laws. Ever since the medical advances
of the twentieth century made early abortions safe and simple, there had
been an increasing gap between law and public opinion on the subject of
abortion. If Professor Cyril C. Means of the New York Law School was
correct in thinking that many of the states, like New York, had originally
passed anti-abortion laws to protect women from careless and dangerous
surgery, then the reason for the legal protection had disappeared now that
medicine had progressed to the point where abortions performed by
skilled practitioners were actually safer than childbirth. The legal'maxim
Cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex (when the reason for a law has
ceased, the law itself ceases) applied exactly. 3 Because legitimate sur-
geons were forbidden to perform this operation, the existence of the criminal
abortion law began to force women into the hands of illegal abortionists,
* Assistant Professor of Politics, N.C. State University; B.A. Goucher College; M.A.
Wayne State University; Ph.D. Johns Hopkins University.
1410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
3 Means, The Law of New York Concerning Abortion and the Status of the Foetus,
1664-1968: A Case of Cessation of Constitutionality, 14 N.Y.L.F. 411 (1968).
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so that the law itself became a source of danger to the women it was
passed to protect. Its effect was not to keep abortions from taking place,
since possibly a million were performed each year in spite of the law, but
to guarantee that women would bear the risks and dangers of illegal
operations.
It seems clear, however, that the proscription of abortion involved
much more than medical technique and the safety of the woman. The
subject of abortion is closely tied both to religious views and to attitudes
toward the family, which are themselves based on religious beliefs. As
religion has moved from its position of central importance in the life of
the individual, and as economic and other changes have recast the role
of the family in society, so the status of women has begun to change. A
general liberalization of public views on sex, on contraception and abortion
have accompanied these other changes. As women have become freer
as individuals to move out from the family, they have wanted fewer children,
wanted to hold jobs and enter the professions. They have begun to feel
that the satisfactory fulfillment of their own individual lives has depended
on their freedom to choose whether to bear children, and whether to stay
in the home and rear them. As one author put it, the forces which make
women want fewer children, later, are part of the general flow of change
in our society and cannot be checked by the criminal law. 4
But the criminal law has been slow to adjust to these changing social
patterns. Faced with the fact that prohibition did not prevent recourse
to abortion, legal institutions reacted in several different ways. In many
cases, prosecutors and law enforcement officials have ignored illegal
abortions, either because it was too difficult to convict participants or
because too great an expenditure of effort by police was involved. Where
women of means were determined to get legal abortions, the law was
stretched. Doctors and psychiatrists could testify that an abortion was
"necessary" to preserve a woman's health or life; women could go to
jurisdictions in the United States where illegal abortions were tolerated,
or abroad where legal abortions were obtainable. Such relief from the
harshness of the law was often available to the rich, but not to the poor.
One is struck by the parallels between abortion and divorce law, where
the same kinds of gaps developed between law and social demands.
Changes in the status of women were behind problems in both areas.
Some of the same types of adjustments were used where practice and
theory were too far apart. Like abortion law, divorce law was kept in-
tact only by sacrificing its integrity. Divorces could be obtained by elastic
interpretation of available grounds, perjury, faked evidence, and by the
flight of the wealthy to jurisdictions where divorce could be obtained easily
4 Sigworth, Abortion Laws in the Federal Courts-The Supreme Court as Supreme
Platonic Guardian, 5 IND. LEGAL F. 130 (1971).
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for those with money. "The facade of a semi-puritan ethics is preserved
at the cost of sacrificing the integrity of the law and often creating one law
for the rich, another for the poor." ' 5 The failure of abortion law to re-
flect social realities had similar social costs: law enforcement was dis-
honest or non-existent, respect for the law suffered, injuries and deaths
from improper abortions caused a severe problem of public health, and
women themselves paid a high price in physical well-being and self-respect.
At some point during the 1950's and 1960's individual yearnings and
the increased social costs of existing policies intersected with rising de-
mands for population limitation. As early as 1955, the Planned Parenthood
Federation came out for a revision of the abortion laws. Abortion was
looked to, along with contraception and voluntary sterilization, as a means
of checking the population explosion. The stringent criminal abortion
laws were not only unduly harsh on individuals, but many organizations
now began to see them as contrary to correct public policy.
In the decade 1960-1970 more than half the population had come to
believe that abortion ought to be allowed, at least where the mother's
life was in danger.6 But if pro-abortion groups were to be able to take
advantage of this shift in attitudes, they would have to organize, mobilize
public opinion, and lobby vigorously for the necessary changes in state law,
rather than merely sitting back and hoping for reform. Enough pressure
had to be generated to counteract the conservative and Roman Catholic
forces in state legislatures which opposed any change at all. Increasingly,
groups became willing to do this. In hearings before the Kentucky leg-
islature in 1972 a list of sixty organizations was presented as supporting
the reform proposal. 7 Such groups ran the gamut from the American
Association of University Women to Zero Population Growth, but mostly
they fell into four categories: women's, church, medical, and conservation
groups. Women's groups and ad hoc pro-abortion organizations like the
Women's National Abortion Act Coalition helped supply some of the
loudest and most vigorous lobbying efforts, almost managing to get a
pro-abortion plank in the 1972 Democratic Platform.
Another significant element in the movement for change was the exis-
tence after 1959 of the American Law Institute's model abortion reform
proposal, which gave state legislators a definite and well-drafted provision
to introduce, and gave reform groups a specific proposal to support. Once
the first few states had broken the ice and passed such a measure, leg-
islatures throughout the country began to consider reform, even though
in some cases it was rejected.
I W. FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 219 (1959).
6 Blake, Abortion and Public Opinion: The 1960-1970 Decade, 171 SCIENCE 540, 540-9
(1971).
' Hearings on the 1972 Abortion Act Before the Special Subcomm. of Ky. House of Rep.,
1972 Sess., Legislative Research Comm., Info. Bull., No. 95, at 23 (1972).
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Writing in 1959, Professor Wolfgang Friedmann predicted that western
countries would probably move in gradual stages from the outright pro-
hibitions of abortion laws to limited reforms, allowing abortion for "med-
ical indications":
The only reason for advocating the more limited extension of the
legitimacy of abortion ... is that public opinion, in most countries
of the Western World, would not presently support the radical
jump from a narrowly confined legalization of abortion to the com-
plete abolition of criminal sanction. Hence, the more cautious
and controlled extension of the Scandinavian pattern seems to be
a more realistic approach to the problem. 8
This prediction, indeed, fit the facts in the United States. Gallup and
other public opinion surveys throughout the 1960's showed that while
the public had come to accept the idea of abortion to protect the mother's
life, it was still opposed to abortion on demand, or abortion for economic
reasons alone. 9 The instincts of the members of the American Law In-
stitute and those in state legislatures who were willing to support abortion
law revision, were correct in reading the public's demand for change as a
demand for conservative reforms. However, by 1966, even though some
movement toward modification was visible, an advance guard of human-
itarian, medical, and feminist groups was already beginning to see moderate
change as inadequate both in terms of women's rights and aspirations
and in its ability to achieve the desired social ends. When they perceived,
also, that a long, hard legislative struggle was likely to result only in very
modest relaxation of restrictions on abortion, they turned to the courts.
In spite of our theoretical convictions, in this country, that legislatures
should innovate and courts apply the law, pressure groups are often less
particular about separation of powers (or division of functions) and will
seek to influence policy in any forum available. Courts, indeed, may
afford a quicker response to social demands since individual parties can
activate judicial machinery, and the courts need not approach social
maladjustments in their broadest and most complicated aspects, but can
look at them in relation to individual problems in the narrowest possible
focus. American courts, in recent years, have been accessible to claims
which have been denied representation in legislative bodies. Pro-abortion
forces were quick to see that if they were accorded standing and could make
arguable constitutional claims in the courts, a judicial ruling that abortion
laws denied constitutional rights would have more desirable results than
piecemeal and limited reform measures inched through state legislatures.
On the problem of standing and the definition of appropriate constitutional
claims, undoubtedly the long struggle to get contraception cases into the
I W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 5, at 238.9 Blake, supra note 6, at 542.
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courts had made it easier to get a judicial test of abortion laws. Without
these preliminary victories and the establishment of a right to privacy
in Griswold v. Connecticut, there would have been no basis for lower
court decisions, appeals from which bombarded the Supreme Court in
the early 1970's.
When the Supreme Court finally took and decided the two abortion
cases, it possibly jumped slightly ahead of the majority consensus, al-
though it was clear that public opinion had for a long time been moving
toward a more liberal position on abortion. The Court's decision did not,
however, settle the issue, since conservative forces were unwilling to
accept its ruling as definitive and were prepared to attack to limit its im-
pact, or possibly to overturn it by constitutional amendment. The de-
cision did shift the scene of battle and change the balance of forces, in-
jecting a number of new factors into the controversy, although the proper
relation of law to abortion, even after the Court's ruling, was still to be
settled.
The account which follows is an attempt to give some of the details
of this chapter in the dispute over abortion law modification and to de-
scribe the interplay of public opinion, politics, law, and governmental
institutions as society struggled to find an accommodation among con-
flicting demands on an extremely complex and explosive topic.
The Issue Emerges: The Movement for Abortion Law Reform
It is interesting, at the outset of this account, to speculate as to just why
abortion reform became a political issue when it did. Most of the laws
on state statute books making abortions criminal had been put there during
the last half of the nineteenth century. Such laws usually were extremely
restrictive, allowing legal abortions only where necessary to save the
mother's life. 10 Yet in spite of extremely repressive legislation, abortions
were being performed by the thousands, or hundreds of thousands and
society was ignoring the fact that, according to one doctor, one out of five
pregnancies were ending in illegal abortions. "Never in history,' he wrote,
"has there been such a frank and universal disregard for a criminal law." "
A good many of those seeking abortions were married women. The
toll in pain and suffering from illegal abortions was very high. Figures
on the total number of illegal abortions performed each year varied, but
estimates ran as high as one million, with perhaps 5,000 of these ending
in death.'" Yet criminal prosecutions were not numerous, abortion being
what some observers have labelled a consensual crime, an act which has
been declared contrary to public policy, yet has no "victim" willing to
10 Leavy and Kummer, Criminal Abortion: Human Hardship and Unyielding Laws,
35 S. CAL. L. REV. 126 (1962).
11 Id., at 126 quoting Dr. F. J. Taussig.
12 Id.
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start criminal proceedings with a complaint. It was up to the state to in-
vestigate, collect evidence, and prosecute, and often it was very difficult
to get the women involved to testify as witnesses.
A look at the Index to Legal Periodicals attests to the lack of interest
in the subject of abortion law reform by the legal profession until the late
1960's. No more than one or two articles per year are listed throughout
the 1950's, mostly on criminal law or torts. The 1958-61 volume, however,
lists ten entries, several on therapeutic abortion. Twelve are listed .in
1961-64, twenty-five in 1964-67, and in 1967-70 there were two full col-
umns of entries, single spaced. Somewhere in the 1960's abortion reform
had become a matter of widespread discussion.
The earliest critics of existing legislation were the doctors, many of
whom listened to heart-rending stories from women patients but were
unable to take any helpful action without subjecting themselves to legal
penalties. Whenever the subject came up, there were accounts of terrible
tragedies-rapes and incest, deformed children, mothers who could not
be helped because the law allowed abortion only to "save the life" of
the mother. These incidents and the conflicts which many doctors felt
between the existing law and what they considered to be proper treat-
ment for their patients raised the question of abortion law reform in medical
groups. Religious counselors, feeling the same kinds of conflicts, also
began to discuss reform. Lawyers were shocked by the widespread dis-
regard for the law and the rigidity of existing statutes.
Although reform was being considered by individuals and groups pri-
vately, only a small group was ready, at first, to discuss the matter in
public. Women generally, whose interests were the most vitally involved,
would not speak out because of the aura of social stigma surrounding
the subject. When the prestigious American Law Institute recommended,
in 1959, a tentative uniform state abortion law which would give broader
grounds for legal abortions, discussions became more open.13
The proposed Uniform Abortion Act would have allowed legal abor-
tions for three reasons: 1-pregnancy resulting from rape or incest, 2--evi-
dence that the child would be born deformed, or 3-grave impairment
of the mother's physical or mental health. 14 This tentative draft became
a Proposed Official Draft in 1962. But by 1966 no state had adopted it,
though there had been proposals of similar legislation in two states.' 5
The emergence of the abortion issue as a full scale controversy in the
1960's was probably due to the fact that at this time individual demands
13 Cisler, Unfinished Business: Birth Control and Women's Liberation, in SISTERHOOD IS
POWERFUL 274 (R. Morgan ed., 1970).
11 Id. The final text of the A.L.I. MODEL PENAL.CODE Provisions on Abortion is reprinted
following Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). Appendix B.
15 The Law of Therapeutic Abortion, A Social Commentary on Proposed Reform,
15 J. PUB. L. 396 (1966).
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for alleviation of the harshness of the law intersected with society's awak-
ening interest in such matters as population control. Changes in medical
techniques had by this time made abortions a relatively safe medical pro-
cedure; the "pill" was being introduced widely, as were I.U.D.s and other
contraceptive devices. Throughout the world both abortion and contracep-
tion were seen as desirable in the light of concern over the population
explosion and the degradation of the environment. In every country people
were asking, "Will the world be able to accommodate ever increasing
additions to its population?" Abortion laws in the United States were
far stricter than in most non-catholic countries throughout the world.
The most liberal group, Japan and Eastern Europe, allowed abortion vir-
tually on demand. A more moderate group, including the Scandinavian
countries and Great Britain, permitted abortions to protect the mother's
health. Only the Catholic countries prohibited the practice as completely
as the United States, although illegal abortions were extremely numerous
in those countries, as they were here.
16
Within the United States there were many groups advocating the
limitation of human reproduction for a variety of reasons: environmental,
stopping a decline in the "quality of living", decreasing additions to wel-
fare rolls, decreasing the numbers of illegitimate births or the number
of illegal abortions. The thalidomide tragedy in Europe and a German
Measles (rubella) epidemic in the United States during 1963-65 made it
imperative to provide more elasticity to the law to accommodate women
who were afraid they might give birth to deformed or retarded children.' 7
The Beginnings of Legislative Reform
It was possibly the measles epidemic which acted as the proximate
cause of the reform movement. Although the A. L. 1. draft bill and proposed
reform law was followed by the introduction of bills in the California leg-
islature in 1961, and again in 1963, and although reform was supported
by grand juries in the counties, thirteen District Attorneys, and the Cal-
ifornia Medical Association,' these bills did not have either organized
backing or a ground swell of public opinion behind them. In the 1962-65
period, however, an epidemic of German Measles swept the country; about
82,000 pregnant women contracted the disease and many of these sought
abortions, mostly without success. An estimated 15,000 defective babies
were born. 19 California hospitals, among others, felt the pressure of de-
mands from frightened mothers and many hospitals in the State complied,
illegally, with their requests. Existing California law allowed abortion
"6 Graham, Review of Abortion, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1967, § 4, at It.
17 Moyers, Abortion Laws: A Study in Social Change, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 237 (1970).
"8 Monroe, How California's Abortion Law Isn't Working, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1968
(Magazine) at 11.
19 Id.
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only to save the life of the mother. In 1965, state officials investigated
some of these hospitals and ordered nine doctors from the San Francisco
area to appear before the State Board on charges of unprofessional con-
duct.20 It was rumored that another 39 would soon be called to account.
Although the charges brought against these doctors served to stop
further abortions from being performed in California hospitals, they raised
public consciousness about the problem. A Citizens Defense Fund on
Therapeutic Abortions was launched in California and in other states
to defend the San Francisco Nine. 21 Medical school deans and medical
society leaders signed a brief in their defense. California State Senator
Anthony C. Beilenson introduced a new reform bill in the legislature. 22
This bill had the support of the Episcopal and Jewish churches, women's
organizations, and abortion counselling services, as well as medical groups
and individual doctors. Many of these groups lobbied for the bill in
Sacramento. 23 In spite of strong Catholic opposition which hired a public
relations firm2 4 to fight for the maintenance of the old law, the legislature
was convinced that public support was there for reform, and the bill was
passed and signed by Governor Reagan in 1967.25
By this time the Colorado legislature had already acted to pass a sim-
ilar law, the first in the nation. 26 Other states were also introducing leg-
islation of this type: Delaware, Maryland, Georgia, Oklahoma, Florida,
New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina. In 1967 the
American Medical Association backed the liberalized bills.27 Between
1967 and 1970, 12 states adopted some version of the reform bill, usually
basing the legislation on the American Law Institute's Model Code.28
There were also setbacks in several legislatures, with Connecticut and
Maine rejecting change. New York, Alaska, and Hawaii went even further
than the model law, rejecting reform in favor of outright repeal, with
the only restriction left on abortions the requirement that they be performed
before the 20th week (in New York, the 24th). 29
The fight in the New York legislature was particularly bitter. It began
in March, 1966, when the legislature held hearings on the Sutton bill which
would have reformed New York's 85 year old anti-abortion statute. 30
20 Id., at 17.
21 N.Y. Times, March 12, 1967.
22 Monroe, supra note 18, at 17.
21 Moyers, supra note 17, at 239.
24 Monroe, supra note 18, at 17.
25 Id.
20 Graham, Colorado Pioneers on Legal Abortions, N.Y. Times, April 30, 1967, § 4,
at 6. Although California had been the pioneer in introducing abortion reform legislation,
Colorado, with fewer Catholics in the state, had less difficulty passing a reform law.
27 N.Y. Times, June 22 and June 25, 1967.
28 Congressional Quarterly Fact Sheet, July 24, 1970, at 1914.
29 Id.
30 N.Y. Times, March 7, 1966.
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Governor Rockefeller came out in favor of liberalization, but the bill was
defeated.3 1 Another reform bill, the so-called Blumenthal bill, a mild re-
form measure, was introduced in January, 1967, but was eventually de-
feated after a year of ferocious battling, in 1969. In 1970 reform forces
finally succeeded, over intense opposition by the Catholic Church, in
enacting an extremely permissive law. A new factor which may have
helped swing the balance in New York was the emergence of activist,
highly visible womens groups, ready to take to the streets in support of
abortion reform.
Women's Liberation and Abortion Reform
Organized women's liberation groups springing up in the late 1960's
ranged from the moderate National Organization for Women (NOW)
to various radical feminist groups such as Redstockings, WITCH, and
the Feminists.3 2 Betty Friedan's book The Feminine Mystique, published
in 1963, seems to have been one of the catalysts which set the women's
movement to sizzling and bubbling. Once the "problem without a name"
had been identified, namely that many women were unhappy with roles
which kept them in the home and suddenly realized that their feelings
of frustration and non-fulfillment were not unique, a wide variety of pol-
itical activity began to take place, some of it an offshoot of radical pol-
itics, some of it inspired by the civil rights movement. One of the issues
on which almost all of these new women's groups could agree was that
the woman who wanted a legal abortion should have the right to one. 33
Since the beginning of World War II, women had been moving out of the
home into jobs and into the professions; now they began to recognize
that two essential prerequisites to job equality were the ability to limit
reproduction and the provision of suitable child care for working women,
state supported if necessary. A woman who had to leave her job or career
to give birth to a child, or who did not have a reliable place to leave existing
children, could not compete on the same level with male workers. Lucinda
Cisler, an activist in the birth control movement emphasized the right of
women to limit their reproduction:
Without the full capacity to limit her own reproduction, a woman's
other "freedoms" are tantalizing mockeries that cannot be exer-
cised. With it, others cannot long be denied, since the chief rationale
for denial disappears.3 4
The New York fight brought vocal and dramatic pressures from the
women's organizations. While women had been reluctant to speak out
before, the existence of Women's Lib made the experience less traumatic.
31 N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1966.
32 See C. WARE, WOMAN POWER: THE MOVEMENT FOR WOMEN'S LIBERATION (1970).
33 Id. at 121.
34 Cisler, supra note 13, at 246.
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Actresses told of their abortions in news conferences and magazine ar-
ticles. Women appeared, now, whenever there was a public discussion
of abortion to protest the domination of panels by male "experts". NOW
charged that a prestigious conference on abortion co-sponsored by the
Kennedy Foundation and the Harvard Theological School was controlled
by academicians and Roman Catholics, and included only three women.3 5
Women also took to the streets, marching and picketing. The Redstockings,
a radical group, stormed a New York legislative hearing in which fifteen
"experts" were testifying (fourteen men and one woman, a nun), shouting,
"We are the experts!"13 6 To prove it they held an open meeting in which
women got up before the audience to tell of their own abortions.3 7 Later,
in 1970, lobbying for passage of the bill then being considered in the leg-
islature, women's groups demonstrated near Bellevue Hospital, St.
Patrick's Cathedral, and in Union Square, 38 held a guerilla theatre per-
formance in the streets, and handed out wire coat hangers, lacquered
blood red.3 9 Such activities dramatized the abortion issue and helped
overcome the feelings of shame and guilt which surrounded the subject
of abortion, allowing women to break loose to assert their interests in
the political arena.
On April 3, 1970, only a few days after these demonstrations, the New
York legislature passed the law it had been debating, one which took off
all controls from abortions performed before the 24th week. The women's
groups were convinced that they had made an important contribution
to this decision. Certainly they had not only helped publicize the issue-
their protests and marches, and their rhetoric, made good newspaper copy
and good television news clips-but they had helped to mobilize and
organize support to counteract the strong pro-Church pressures.
Repeal Not Reform. Dissatisfaction With The Legislative Approach
The entry of the women's groups into the abortion controversy also
helped change the nature of the reform movement. Many of the women
were not satisfied with abortion reform along the lines laid out in the A.L.I.
type statutes. They felt that the rationale behind the reform legislation
was wrong; it should not be a matter of "allowing" women who had been
raped, were ill, or who might bear deformed children to have abortions,
rather, it was a matter of women having a right to control their own bodies
and their own destinies. 40 Not only were reform statutes too restrictive,
not only did they operate unfairly, but they were built upon the wrong
35 N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1967.
36 D. SCHULDER AND F. KENNEDY, ABORTION RAP 3-4 (1971).
37 Id.
38 Id. at 178-9.
39 Id. at 179.
40 Cisler, supra note 13, at 274-81.
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major premise. An anti-abortion law was nothing but a "compulsory
pregnancy" law, forcing a woman to bear children when in her opinion it
was unwise or undesirable. These laws shold not be reformed, but repealed
altogether:
Public opinion polls have repeatedly posed the wrong questions
to their samples ("In what circumstances would you allow a woman
to have an abortion?"), reinforcing the presumptuous notion that
someone has a right to disallow a woman to choose, and getting
the same tiny percentages "favoring liberalization," again and again.
Usually they have not even offered repeal as an alternative choice.
This is like asking, "Do you favor freeing a slave when his bondage
is (1) injurious to his health, (2) .. .?,41
In 1969 and 1970 the demand came to be not for reform of the abortion
laws, but for outright repeal.
Experience with the reform laws in states which had passed them seemed
to indicate that they would have very little positive impact. It was becoming
clear that the reform bills on the A.L.I. model would allow legal abortions
only in a very narrow range of cases, and that it would be difficult, if not
impossible for any great number of women to qualify for legal abortions.
Fred P. Graham, writing for the New York Times in 1967, foresaw the
problem, predicting that, "Even if abortion reform proceeds at an ac-
celerated pace as predicted, the changes will be so minor that this nation's
laws will remain among the most restrictive in the world." ' 4 Not only
did the laws allow abortion only in an extremely narrow set of circum-
stances, but they probably only helped fairly well educated, middle-
class women. The bureaucratic routines required by hospital abortion
committees, and the statements by doctors and psychiatrists, and the fees,
kept all but persistent and knowledgeable women from utilizing the new
laws. "Where will the ghetto-dweller find a psychiatrist to testify that
she runs a grave risk of emotional impairment if she is forced to give birth
to her nth baby?"' 43 Even when cases seemed clearly within the limits
allowable for legal abortions, women were often turned down or turned
away by hospitals; it was much safer to resolve any doubt against
the woman suppliant. And so it became clear to the women's groups
that repeal of existing abortion laws would be much more beneficial
to their cause than further efforts in favor of "reform", which they
began actively to oppose. Repeal the laws and leave the subject to
the woman and her physician; remove the state and its coercive powers
from the picture entirely:
Great things were expected of "reform": the illegal abortion racket
would die, only wanted, healthy children would be born, and we
41 Id. at 277.
42 Graham, Review of Abortion, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1967, § 4, at 11.
43 1-. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 344 (1968).
11
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would all be happy. Of course it didn't turn out like that: "reform"
states were afraid of becoming "abortion mills" and their hospitals
began, probably unconstitutionally, to refuse help to anyone who
didn't come from their state or even from their city; the more pros-
perous women who used to fly to foreign parts or to New York City
for illegal abortions could now stay closer to home and be attended
by the family doctor, while poor women often didn't even know
the new law existed, much less how to stretch it for their own pur-
poses; city women tended to get more legal abortions than women
served only by the smaller, more conservative town or rural hos-
pitals; and we were hardly much happier. 44
Into The Courts
Not only were the efforts made after 1969 by pro-abortion forces di-
rected towards repeal, but by this time it also appeared that the courts
might be a more promising avenue than the legislature. If legal grounds
could be found for invalidating state abortion laws, the whole restrictive
structure would fall at one blow, and the bitter, local engagements in 47
state legislatures (Hawaii, Alaska, and New York had permissive legis-
lation by 1970), which only produced minimal changes at best, could be
avoided. But how were women to go about getting these cases into court?
A case decided in the Supreme Court in 1965 suggested some pos-
sibilities to potential litigants. Griswold v. Connecticut45 was the outcome
of years of litigation over the Connecticut birth control statute, a law which
prevented the sale, use, or dissemination of information about contra-
ceptives. After twenty-five years of efforts to get a court test of this law,
a project hindered by the fact that the state did not actively prosecute
under the law but still used the legal prohibition to discourage birth control
clinics or any other means or spreading information about contraception,
problems of standing had finally been overcome and a decision handed
down on the merits. Several of the doctrines established in the Griswold
case were to open the door to later challenges of the anti-abortion laws.
First of all, Griswold established a right of "marital privacy"; many of
the rights in the Bill of Rights exude faint exhalations of privacy, and these
taken together, according to Justice Douglas' majority opinion, establish
a "zone of privacy." The marriage relationship lies within this zone of
privacy, and the state may not regulate in such a way as to invade this
zone unnecessarily. "We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill
of Rights---older than our political parties, older than our school system.
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring,
and intimate to the degree of being sacred." 46 The State must have a sub-
44 Cisler, supra note 13, at 275. See also Monroe, supra note 18, at 10.
45 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
46 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
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stantial "governmental purpose" for infringing this ancient liberty; it
may not invade this right for trivial reasons.
Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold suggested another
constitutional basis for protecting the rights of privacy in marriage. The
Ninth Amendment states that "The enumeration in the Constitution of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained
by the people." This provision can be read to protect the whole area of
fundamental and traditional rights which predate the Constitution and
which were not intended to be waived by its adoption. One of the dissenters
labelled this interpretation of the Ninth Amendment as turning "somer-
saults with history"; it was however, to be picked up in briefs, lower court
decisions, and ultimately by the majority in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton
as establishing a right to marital privacy protected from state invasion
without substantial reason.
If the Griswold case established rights of marital privacy whose in-
fringement could be argued in challenges to state abortion laws, other
thinking was also laying a foundation for future court challenges. In 1968
a young law professor, Roy Lucas, published an influential article in the
North Carolina Law Review.4 7 Although he drew on material in earlier
articles by other authors, this was the first time there had been an attempt
to work out a consistent constitutional attack on state abortion statutes.
Isolating four different interests of the parties involved in abortion con-
troversies-those of the woman, the fetus, the physician, and the state-
he drew up a list of possible avenues of vindicating the interests he thought
were predominant, those of the woman and the physician.
Lucas felt that existing state legislation was open to attack because
it was not uniformly enforced, the scope of these criminal statutes was
uncertain and their standards were vague, the older laws were out of phase
with modem medical standards, they were discriminatory in effect (since
some women could get abortions under the laws and others could not),
and they violated the First Amendment's religious clauses by putting criminal
sanctions behind religious values. The Griswold case and earlier birth
control cases had opened up the possibility of raising the right to privacy
as a constitutional argument in abortion cases. Now Lucas' article sug-
gested several other fruitful bases for attacking the constitutionality of state
abortion statutes.
Also about this time, the courts were beginning to be more tolerant of
the use of declaratory judgment proceedings in criminal cases, opening
the way for interested parties to test these laws without becoming en-
meshed in criminal prosecutions. 4 In 1962, when Sherri Finkbine had
41 Lucas, Federal Constitutional Limitations on the Enforcement and Administration
of State Abortion Statutes, 46 N.C.L. REV. 730 (1%8).
48 Declaratory Relief in Criminal Law, 80 HARV. L. REV 1490 (1%7); see also Lucas,
supra note 47, at 753, n. 94.
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gone to the Arizona courts to contest a law which would not allow her
to have a thalidomide baby aborted, the Court had dismissed her petition
for declaratory relief without considering the merits, holding that there
was no legal controversy. The state prosecutor had refused to state that
there was any danger of her being prosecuted under the Arizona anti-
abortion laws. If she was in no danger of prosecution, there was no legal
dispute, and she had no grounds for challenging the statute. 49 She was
forced to go abroad for her abortion. As had been clear in the Connecticut
birth control litigation, a state could block the testing of a law by showing
an unwillingness to prosecute under it, therefore making it difficult for
anyone to show standing. Until the courts began to allow parties to bring
suits for declaratory judgments to test the constitutionality of laws, rather
than making them raise their claims in criminal prosecutions, it was very
difficult to test abortion laws. Although tort actions would have been
possible against hospitals, or malpractice suits by women against doctors,
most of the early cases where their constitutionality was challenged were
in criminal prosecutions involving doctors.
Indeed, an appeal from a criminal conviction gave rise to one of the
earliest successful attacks on a state abortion statute. In People v. Belous 50
the California Supreme Court overturned the conviction of a physician
under the pre-reform California statute which forbade abortions except
where the operation was necessary to preserve the woman's life. The
California Court held that this was too vague a standard for a criminal
law. In its opinion the court supplied building blocks for later attacks on
state laws, asserting that the woman has "a fundamental right ... to
choose to bear children" and also that state abortion laws originally de-
signed to preserve maternal health, now frequently did just the opposite
by making safe, legal abortions unavailable.
The indictment on abortion charges of another doctor, this time in the
District of Columbia, provided another building block for attorneys anx-
ious to bring abortion law challenges into court. The United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the indictments on
grounds that this statute was also unconstitutionally vague. A badly split
Supreme Court decided an appeal from this dismissal in 1971. 5 1 The Court
could easily have rejected this case on jurisdictional grounds, but as Justice
Black wrote for the majority:
In the last several years, abortion laws have been repeatedly at-
tacked as unconstitutionally vague in both state and federal courts
with widely varying results. A number of these cases are now
pending on our docket. A refusal to accept jurisdiction here would
only compound confusion for doctors, their patients, and law en-
forcement officials. 5 2
49 Id. at 1490.
" 71 Cal.2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969).
"' United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
12 Id. at 66.
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Although the Vuitch case decided merely that the statute could not put
the burden of proving that an abortion was necessary on the doctor, but
rather that the burden of proving it was not would have to be undertaken
by the state, this additional favorable anti-abortion decision further en-
couraged litigation.
At this point, armed with the favorable precedent of the Belous case
plus the suggestions of Roy Lucas, 53 several suits were introduced in
the New York federal courts seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
from the state's abortion laws. One of these suits, Abramowicz v. Lef-
kowitz5 4 was a class action by various women, married and unmarried;
another was a suit by the Clergyman's Consultation Service on Abortion;
a third was begun by a community law firm; and a fourth, by four physicians.
All these suits represented a large number of individuals and organiza-
tions, and challenged the New York law on a wide variety of grounds.
Initiated by forces which had been only narrowly defeated in the state
legislature, these suits were declared moot when New York passed its
reform law in 1970, but they were typical of suits now coming into state
and federal courts in other parts of the country, in that they no longer
relied exclusively on raising abortion challenges in criminal prosecutions,
but were trying to use declaratory judgment and injunction procedures,
and also in their assertions of such rights as the right to privacy, the Ninth
Amendment, rights of association and information protected by the First
Amendment, the right to bear children, the right to speedy medical care,
life and liberty protected by due process, equal protection, rights to re-
ligious freedom, the prohibition against establishing a church, the pro-
hibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the right to a career, the
taxpayer's right to equal access to medical services, and the Thirteenth
Amendment's protection against involuntary servitude. A veritable smor-
gasbord of constitutional claims now appeared to have, at least, possibilities.
By the summer of 1970, legal actions, civil and criminal, were pending
in 20 states.55 During the 1970 term, appeals and petitions for certiorari
bombarded the Supreme Court. 56 Obviously the Supreme Court's nar-
rowly technical decision in the Vuitch case was not going to be the end
of its involvement with the abortion controversy.
Into the Supreme Court: Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton
Appeals from District Court decisions invalidating abortion laws in
13 Lucas was an attorney for the doctors' group in Hall v. Lefkowitz, a companion case
to Abramowicz v. LeJkowitz.
-4 This case was brought in the fall of 1%9 in the United States District Court, Southern
District, New York (69 Civ. 4469, 1969); it was declared moot upon passage of New York's
abortion reform law in 1970. The case is discussed in D. SCHULDER AND F. KENNEDY,
supra note 35.
55 Congressional Quarterly Fact Sheet, July 24, 1970, at 1913.
56 Sigworth, supra note 4, at 132. This article discusses cases coming to the Supreme Court
during the 1970 Term and some of the jurisdictional problems they presented
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Texas and Georgia finally brought the issue back into the Supreme Court.
These two cases involved both the older and the reform versions of state
anti-abortion statutes. First argued in December, 1971, and reargued in
October, 1972, the cases had been before the Court for over a year. Ac-
cording to some sources, the long wait had reflected disagreement within
the Court as to how the cases should be handled. In conference, after the
initial argument in 1971, the vote seems to have been five to two to strike
down the abortion laws; at this time Justices Hugo Black and John Marshall
Harlan had left the Court and their replacements had not yet been sworn
in. According to Time magazine Chief Justice Burger had taken the un-
precedented step of assigning the majority opinion, even though he him-
self was on the dissenting side.57 According to Supreme Court custom,
this should have been the responsibility of Justice William 0. Douglas,
the senior member of the majority. The assignment was made to Justice
Harry A. Blackmun, a former Court of Appeals Judge who had served
as counsel to the Mayo Clinic from 1950 to 1959 before ascending the
federal bench. 58 Justice Blackmun may have been chosen to write this
opinion because of his medical-legal background; it could also be true
that the Chief Justice wanted to avoid the kind of broadly written right
to privacy opinion which Justice Douglas had composed in Griswold
v. Connecticut (and which, indeed, he wrote as a concurrence, in these
cases).
In any event, Blackmun's draft opinion, circulated at the end of the year,
did not satisfy other members of the majority, and he withdrew it, asking
that the case be set for reargument in the fall. By this time, the two newest
Nixon appointees, Justices Powell and Rehnquist, had taken their seats
and it was a possibility that their votes could affect the outcome of the
case. According to Time, Justice Douglas was so angered by what he
saw as unjustified interference and maneuvering with the Court's pro-
cedures that he threatened to make the dispute public. 59 However, as
it turned out, the majority's vote after reargument was enhanced rather
than diminished. Newly appointed Justice Powell joined the majority,
and then the Chief Justice himself, possibly to help form a more unified
Court on such a controversial issue, changed his vote and supported Justice
Blackmun's rewritten opinion. Justices Byron R. White and William H.
Rehnquist dissented.
The first case, Roe v. Wade, involved a challenge to a Texas law passed
in 1857 which made the procuring of an abortion a crime except where
the act was done to save the life of the mother. Jane Roe, a pregnant
woman, sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas law was unconsti-
tutional because it denied her access to a safe, legal abortion, performed
17 TIME, Feb. 5, 1973, at 51.
58 Wash. Post, April 18, 1970, § C, at 1-2.
59 TIME, Feb. 5, 1973, at 51.
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by a competent physician. She challenged it under the First, Fourth, Fifth,
Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
The second case, Doe v. Bolton, attacked the Georgia statute of the
A.L.I. type, though the Georgia statute wrapped the process of obtaining
an abortion in considerably more red tape than did the A.L.I. model.
Mary Doe alleged that she was a pregnant woman who had been advised
that her health would be endangered if she gave birth, but who had been
denied an abortion by the Abortion Committee of the Grady Memorial
Hospital in Atlanta. She sought a declaratory judgment holding that the
Georgia statute was unconstitutional, as well as injunctive relief.
Both cases presented a unique problem of standing. Since pregnancies
last only nine months, and the complicated process of challenging a state
law can hardly be completed in that short a time, this type of case raises
a question of whether abortion statutes can ever be challenged, since
the delivery of the babies will render the controversy moot each time.
Justice Blackmun, for the majority, agreed that abortion cases should be
treated as exceptions to the general rule that an actual controversy must
exist at appellate stages of a case, and not simply at the date the action
was initiated. 60
Once the issue of standing had been decided, Justice Blackmun's
task was to find a strategy for deciding these cases which would not get the
Court too deeply involved in highly controversial, non-legal issues. He
and the Court wanted to avoid, on the one hand, issues of morality and
religion which were basically insoluble except in terms of individual be-
lief and religious preferences. On the other hand, it was also desirable to
avoid too direct a confrontation with straight issues of social policy, mat-
ters such as population growth, birth rates, illegitimacy, welfare, the
roles of the sexes, family planning, and the like. The Supreme Court had
been roundly criticised for taking a sociological approach in Brown v.
Board of Education, and certainly with a full complement of Nixon ap-
pointees it would veer away from a decision based on psychology or so-
ciology or any of the "softer" sciences. As it was, the Chief Justice felt
that Blackmun's opinion ventured too far from legal principles, grumbling
in his concurring opinion that, "I am somewhat troubled that the Court
has taken notice of various scientific and medical data in reaching its con-
clusion; however, I do not believe that the Court has exceeded the scope
of judicial notice accepted in other contexts. ' '61
Justice Blackmun, however, was very obviously aware of the reefs
and shoals lying below the legal issues in these cases. He stated this con-
cern early in his opinion:
I Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Further citations to Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton
will be to the Supreme Court Reporter, advance sheets, since the official edition was not
available when this article was written. Standing is discussed, 93 S.Ct. 705, 712-13.
61 Id. at 755.
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We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sensitive and
emotional nature of the abortion controversy, of the vigorous op-
posing view, even among physicians, and of the deep and seemingly
absolute convictions that the subject inspires. One's philosophy,
one's experiences, one's exposure to the raw edges of human exis-
tence, one's religious training, one's attitudes toward life and family
and their values, and the moral standards one establishes and seeks
to observe, are all likely to influence and to color one's thinking
and conclusions about abortion.
In addition, population growth, pollution, poverty, and racial over-
tones tend to complicate and not to simplify the problem.
Our task, of course, is to resolve the issue by constitutional mea-
surement free of emotion and predilection . .. 62
It was, however, one thing to search for a constitutional yardstick to
measure these issues and another to find one. The Constitution had nothing
very obvious to say on the subject of abortion, so if the Court could find
legal authority which demonstrated that abortion had always been con-
sidered a crime which governments might legitimately prevent, or that
the moral weight of the ages had been against abortion, then it would be
very difficult to hold that the right to have an abortion lay in an area of
protected individual liberties.
One of the troubling obstacles to a holding in favor of liberalized
abortion laws was the traditional Hippocratic oath, sworn by generations
of medical practitioners. This oath, an ethical guide bearing the name
of Hippocrates, the great physician of ancient Greece, included a pro-
hibition against abortion-"I will not give to a woman a pessary to produce
abortion." What was the lesson for the law, if any, of this ancient oath?
Secondly, it might be instructive, before ruling on modern statutes reg-
ulating it, to find how abortion had been treated at common law. Thirdly,
since most state statutes prohibiting or limiting abortion were of nineteenth
century vintage, what had been the legal rules before these statutes were
passed? Why, indeed, had they been enacted in the first place? If Justice
Blackmun could find authoritative answers to some or any of these ques-
tions in legal history, he might be able to decide the case without having
to break new legal ground. The Court would be very reluctant to over-
turn state statutes if there were a venerable and consistent legal tradition
lying behind them; it could follow a conservative course, uphold the power
of state legislatures to resolve the abortion controversy, and avoid having to
reach a decision whereby the Court would inevitably be charged, as in
Brown v. Board of Education, with subjective policy making. After the
publicity given President Nixon's search for strict constructionists, the
four new Nixon appointees would be unusually sensitive to the possibility
62 Id. at 709.
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of such charges. The President had himself come out in opposition to
abortion, and one might expect his new appointees to think twice before
declaring the right to this operation to be of constitutional dimensions.
The Supreme Court has often gone to the past in the hopes of finding
historical authority for solving legal problems. In one of the most famous
instances, Adamson v. California,63 Justices Black and Frankfurter delved
into the history of the passage of the 14th Amendment in the hopes of
finding whether its authors "intended" to "incorporate" the Bill of Rights
under the rubric of due process. Justice Black's interpretation of Article
1, Section 2 that representatives "be chosen by the People of the several
States" in order to support the one-man, one vote principle was also based
on a backward journey into constitutional meaning.64 Researches into
the Framers' views of "separation of church and state" and racial seg-
regation involved this kind of historical research, a type of exercise which
has been termed "law office history." Justice Arthur J. Goldberg had
showed himself to be an ex post facto researcher par excellence by his
discovery in 1965 that the authors of the Bill of Rights had intended the
Ninth Amendment to indicate that "there are fundamental personal rights"
such as the right to privacy in marriage, "which are protected from abridg-
ment by the Government though not specifically mentioned in the Con-
stitution."' 65 As Professor Alfred H. Kelly, a constitutional historian has
put it, history as interpreted by the Supreme Court is often special pleading,
rather than "pedigreed historical truth."' 66 Justice Blackmun's researches,
however, seem to have been more of a search for authority than an at-
tempt to use history to substantiate a thesis already formed. In the absence
of precedent or clear constitutional guidance in answering the constitu-
tional claims made by the appellants, Justice Blackmun was anxious to
find legal or historical tradition on which to base his holding. Presumably,
if he had found that state anti-abortion laws were clearly built on a strong
tradition coming from common law or early American law, he would have
been reluctant to overturn the state statutes, unless they denied equal
protection or procedural due process. But Justice Blackmun did not find
clear guidance in any of his historical researches. The ancient world, he
learned, practiced abortion freely, and while some opposed it, it was a
common practice and not universally considered a crime against nature.
The Hippocratic oath reflected only one of the ancient attitudes on the
subject, that of the Pythagorean school of philosophy, the ethical teachings
of which later appealed strongly to the Christian Church. Under Common
law, abortion before quickening was not regarded as homicide and was not
63 332 U.S. at 46 (1947).
64 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
65 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Concurring opinion.
60 All of these historical forays are discussed in Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit
Love Affair, 1965 S.CT. REv. 119 (1965).
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an indictable offense. The quickening (the first recognizable movement
of the fetus in the womb was called quickening) distinction seems to have
been important to some legal commentators, though where abortion of
a quickened fetus was involved, it is unclear how it was generally regarded.
Such writings as remain treat it inconsistently, some as a misdemeanor,
and some do not see it as a problem with which the courts are concerned.
Justice Blackmun was forced to conclude that "whether abortion of a
quick fetus was a felony at common law, or even a lesser crime, is still
disputed." '6 7 And as for American courts, the few reported cases indicate
that it is doubtful "that abortion was ever firmly established as a common
law crime even with respect to the destruction of a quick fetus." 68
Attitudes towards abortion began to change significantly, Justice
Blackmun discovered, in the 19th century. Abortion after quickening
was made a crime by Act of Parliament in 1803, and by statute in several
of the American states beginning with Connecticut in 1821. It was not
until after the Civil War, however, that legislation generally replaced the
common law. By the 1950's most American states had banned abortion,
except where necessary to save the life of the mother.69 Justice Blackmun
was forced, after this survey, to conclude that "At common law, at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution, and throughout the major por-
tion of the 19th century, abortion was viewed with less disfavor than under
most American statutes currently in effect." At the time the Constitution
was written, he found, women "enjoyed a substantially broader right to
terminate a pregnancy" than they had in most states in 1973.70 It was
the American Medical Association that probably helped bring about the
change to a more restrictive treatment of abortion. From 1857 to 1871
various reports and conferences and resolutions railed against the de-
struction of fetal life and urged changes in the laws to protect it. 7' Some
legislatures may also have acted, as did New York's, to protect women
from the butchery of abortionists 72 and it is likely that doctors were ac-
tive in urging anti-abortion laws for this reason, too.
Justice Blackmun's opinion is unsatisfactory, however, in presenting
an historical picture of the range and motivation of forces behind a move-
ment which brought legislative change in state after state. In doing his
research he did not find any kind of state-by-state historical study of early
anti-abortion legislation. The scanty materials he did discover leave the
reader wondering if this is the whole story. Certainly the medical profes-
sion itself was one of the principal proponents of change, but what other
67 Roe v. Wade, 93 S.Ct. 705, 717 (1973).
68 Id. at 718.
. Id. at 720.
70 Id.
7I Id. at 721.
72 Id. at 724-5.
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interest groups and social forces were working behind the scenes? What
was the role of the Catholic Church, which, in 1869, changed its teaching
to hold that life begins at conception rather than at "ensoulment", which
was supposed to take place at 40 days if the embryo were a male, 80 days
if it were a female.7 To what extent did the need to populate the frontier,
or the increasing power of the middle class, work to produce such leg-
islative changes?
But although Justice Blackmun's discussion of the causal forces is
unsatisfactory, it is clear from his researches that the 19th century pro-
duced a clear legislative prohibition of abortion in almost all states. The
law was no longer neutral in the matter; abortion except to save the life
of the mother was now a crime.
Having gone to history and found that it showed changing attitudes
towards abortion but did not give clear guidance to the Court, Blackmun
now was ready to face the legal issues. These were basically three:
1. Was there any basis to the appellant woman's claims to a consti-
tutional right, infringed by the abortion laws?
2. Were the state's interests in legislating substantial enough to warrant
invasion of this right, if it existed?
3. Did the Constitution protect the life of the fetus under its protection
of "persons" in the due process clause?
The answers, in brief, were that the woman did have constitutionally
protected rights which restricted the state's power to prohibit abortions.
There was a right to privacy in the Constitution, as well as a guarantee
of liberty which must not be unnecessarily invaded. The guarantee of
privacy or personal liberty protects an area of private decision-making
which includes marriage, procreation, contrace-tion, family relation-
ships, child-rearing and education, a realm into which the state should not
intrude without a "compelling" interest. This realm or right is broad
enough to include the abortion decision.
The state's interest in limiting abortion is two-fold (at least as verbalized
in state legislatures and legal briefs): protecting the health of the mother
and the life or potential life of the unborn. The Court did not feel that
the asserted rights of the state, however, were sufficient to warrant in-
trusion into this area of private decision. "Where certain 'fundamental
rights' are involved, the Court has held that regulation may be justified
only by a 'compelling state interest.' -14 Changes in medical technology
had made hospital abortions even safer than childbirth; there were some
doubts, therefore, about the validity of a legislative purpose keyed to the
mother's health or safety. And as for the protection of potential life, there
was no basis in law for a holding that this value outweighed the mother's
73 Id. at 717.
14 Id. at 728.
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health and welfare, at least during the early weeks of embryonic or
fetal development. Traditionally, the fetus had not been protected be-
fore "quickening"; to hold that early, developing fetuses had life, or rights,
which took precedence over the mother's right to make decisions affecting
her own life and health, would involve value judgments which could not
be based on objective standards:
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When
those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy,
and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary,
at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a
position to speculate as to the answer.75
If medical and ethical opinion was split on the question of when life be-
gins, still there was general agreement on "viability," the point at which
the developing child could live apart from the mother. Justice Blackmun
felt that if the unborn child has interests, it is only at this point that they
become tangible.
The mother's right to privacy, however, was not absolute, and the
Court rejected any view that the state had no interests in the abortion
decision, or that the woman had complete freedom of self determination
on the matter, or any right to abortion on demand.
The holding was that in the first trimester of pregnancy, a woman
might decide to have an abortion for medical reasons (including psycho-
logical reasons affecting her mental health) and that she and her physician
should make the decision free from state interference. 76 A state decision
which overrides the woman's rights entirely in the early stages of preg-
nancy violates due process of law. 77 Between the end of the first trimester
until the 24th week, the time when by general agreement the fetus is "vi-
able," because of the increasing danger of abortion to the mother, the
state's interests in maternal health give it the right to regulate for that
purpose. When, from the 24th week on the fetus is "viable" and "pre-
sumably has the capacity of meaningful life outside the mother's womb,"
then the state may, if it chooses, regulate, and even prohibit abortion
altogether except where the mother's life is endangered.7 8 With the ex-
ception that it could not prohibit abortions necessary to save the mother's
life, the state might if it wished forbid all abortions after viability. It might
also regulate the qualifications of persons performing abortions and the
facilities where they could be performed. 79 It could not forbid all abortions
without regard for the stage of pregnancy or without considering other
interests involved.
75 Id. at 730.
76 Id. at 732.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
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In the companion case, Doe v. Bolton, the Court used the same rationale
to overturn a Georgia statute which placed exceedingly complicated safe-
guards around the few justifiable abortions it was willing to permit. Abor-
tion was possible only if pregnancy would endanger a woman's life or
injure her health, if the fetus was likely to be born with serious defects,
or if the pregnancy resulted from rape. But the Georgia law set up an ap-
paratus of restrictive regulations, consultations, abortion review boards,
court actions and requirements that abortions be performed only in cer-
tain accredited hospitals which made this law more restrictive than most
of the A.L.I. type reform bills. It would allow a minimal number of
abortions.
The District Court had invalidated part of this law, and the Supreme
Court now rejected additional restrictions, building on the holding in Roe
that abortions during the first trimester must be left more fully to private
decision.
In the two cases there were three concurrences and two dissents from
other members of the Court. The Chief Justice was troubled by the range
of Blackmun's historical and medical background materials, and would
have preferred a more narrowly legal and constitutional opinion, although
he voted with the majority. Justice Stewart also concurred. He felt that
the Court was correct in its ruling, but should have been forthright enough
to recognize that it was invoking substantive due process, albeit under
another name. The Court needs a substantive due process doctrine, he
argued, and quoted the late Justice Harlan's concept of liberty:
[liberty is] . . . a rational continuum which, broadly speaking,
includes a freedom from all arbitrary impositions and purposeless
restraints .... and which also recognizes what a reasonable and
sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require particularly
careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridg-
ment.
80
Justice Douglas' concurrence elaborated on the right to privacy, working
out a series of categories in which he felt individual life must be left free
from state interference.
Justices Rehnquist and White entered separate dissents, both feeling
that state legislatures, rather than courts, could better resolve the con-
flicts over abortion laws.
Justice Blackmun's opinion was joined by three other members of
the Court, Justices Brennan, Marshall and Powell. Taken as a whole
it was a complex, confusing and interesting opinion, composed of a number
of elements somewhat roughly combined. There is a considerable like-
ihood that it was the result of several drafts by Justice Blackmun himself,
8
'
1o Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 at 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
81 TIME, Feb. 5, 1973, at 51.
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changed, modified and added to in places to incorporate the ideas and
objections advanced by other Justices. Standard procedure in opinion
writing involves circulating the majority opinion to other members of
the Court. The other Justices return it to the author with notes and com-
ments in the margin. 82 It is unlikely that an opinion of this importance would
not have received considerable comment, and perhaps demands for mod-
ification. Some of the loose-jointedness of the opinion may reflect the
author's attempts to meet criticisms from his colleagues; the number of
different elements and dimensions may very well be the result of bargaining
and compromise. Points worth commenting on include the following:
1. The right to privacy. Even though Blackmun's historical researches
turned up the fact that abortion (at least before quickening) was probably
not a criminal act in early American law, he still had to find that anti-
abortion laws infringed some right in order to find a basis for overturning
them. He found this in the right to privacy enunciated in Griswold v. Con-
necticut in 1965. The right to privacy is not a right clearly articulated in
the body of the Constitution or the Bill of Rights; rather it is a right de-
rived or implied from many parts of the document. Critics in fact have
claimed that such a right does not exist. Justice Black, dissenting in the
Griswold case, wrote the following:
The Court talks about a constitutional "right of privacy" as though
there is some constitutional provision or provisions forbidding
any law ever to be passed which might abridge the "privacy" of
individuals. But there is not. 83
In spite of Justice Black's objections, a majority of the Justices held in
Griswold that a right to privacy did exist and that a Connecticut law
which imposed sanctions on the use of contraceptives invaded a zone of
protected private rights. A state statute prohibiting abortions clearly does
not invade privacy in the same way. As Justice Rehnquist dissenting
in Roe pointed out, there is very little that is "private" about an abortion.
There is considerable difference between an operation performed in a
hospital and the intrusion of government agents into the boudoir to search
for contraceptives. Griswold could easily have been distinguished on
this ground. Several of the lower courts, however, building on the Griswold
precedent,8 4 had invoked the right to privacy in a different sense in over-
turning anti-abortion statutes, holding that if a right to privacy exists it
must protect against more than the physical intrusions of governmental
agents. A right to privacy must also guarantee the reservation of intimate
82 W. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY, Chap. 3 (1964).
83 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 508 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
14 See e.g., People v. Belous, 71 Cal 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969).
The holding in the case was that the statute was unconstitutionally vague, but the right
of privacy argument was developed in the Court's opinion. See also Y.W.C.A. v. Kugler,
342 F. Supp. 1048 (D.C. N.J. 1972).
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and personal decisions to private decision-making. The decision to have
sexual intercourse with one's mate, to practice contraception or not, to
have children, to postpone procreation until children can be cared for
properly, and to raise and educate children according to the family's own
standards and values-these decisions should be left to the individuals
involved and not dictated by government policy. This view of the concept
is elaborated at length in Justice Douglas' concurrence. Behind this view
one senses a laissez-faire optimism that if the implementation of popula-
tion control can only be left to private choice dictated by individual self-
interest, the automatic workings and adjustments of the natural order
will solve the problem with a minimum of state meddling. While the Court's
action in these cases in negating state prohibitions on abortion advances
the cause of population limitation, it should not be seen as a victory for
planned population control. It is an old-fashioned, libertarian decision,
attuned to the philosophy of individualism. The rationale for leaving abor-
tion decisions in private hands could also be used to cut down any future
state attempts to regulate population by compulsory limitation of family
size or compulsory sterilization laws.85
2. The Ninth Amendment. The Ninth Amendment's statement that the
enumeration of certain rights in the Constitution should not be taken to
mean that others, not mentioned, are denied, has for the most part of our
history been regarded as a statement of the obvious, namely that men
retain their normal complement of "natural" rights even though the Con-
stitution singles out some, such as freedom of speech, for special pro-
tection. As late as 1947, the only "right" which had been explicitly ac-
knowledged under this clause was the "right to engage in political activ-
ity. 86 Rescued from neglect by Justice Goldberg in his concurring opinion
in the Griswold case, the Ninth Amendment was seen as protecting a right
of marital privacy as one of these rights "not mentioned." The Ninth
Amendment was, therefore, another "available constitutional channel" 87
for the development of a right to privacy, in addition to, or instead of, the
emanations and penumbras fancied by Mr. Justice Douglas in his majority
opinion in Griswold. State and lower federal courts involved in abortion
suits picked up the argument for this purpose. Here again, litigants and
courts were searching for a substitute for the discredited substantive due
process doctrine, which in earlier days would have allowed them to ask
whether a law was an "unconsitutional invasion of liberty."
'5 See Gray, Compulsory Sterilization in a Free Society: Choices and Dilemmas, 41
U. CIN. L. REV. 529 (1972).
16 United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 94 (1947). "... we accept appellant's
contention that the nature of political rights reserved to the people by the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments are involved. The right claimed as inviolate may be stated as the right of a
citizen to act as a party official or worker to further his own political views."
11 See S. FRIEDELBAUM, CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 522-3 (1972).
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3. Substantive due process. Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion,
argues that this decision would make more sense if reached under sub-
stantive due process-the theory that the Supreme Court has the power
to invalidate not only procedurally defective legislation, but also laws
which make substantively improper and unreasonable incursions on per-
sonal liberty. 88 Unfortunately, the Court had repudiated the due process
approach during the 1940's (and reiterated that repudiation as late as
1963 in Ferguson v. Skrupa 89) because of its use in early New Deal days
to invalidate economic regulation in the name of liberty. But Justice Stewart
is persuasive in his argument that due process is a much more suitable
vehicle for invalidating unwarranted governmental intrusions on personal
privacy--the right to be let alone is essentially the right not to be burdened
by "substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints." 90 The
privacy argument is really only a new way of phrasing this familiar concept.
In Roe v. Wade, however, the Court veered away from the discredited
due process holding, when it might have decided that in the modem con-
text of improved medical procedures and social imperatives, such a re-
strictive law was unfair and oppressive and deprived women of their liberty
without due process. The right to be let alone is essentially liberty which
should not be invaded without substantial governmental reason, and it
makes more sense to argue this in the name of liberty than in the name of
privacy, though there is an element of both. The right to privacy phrasing,
like the right to travel and the right of association, are modern expressions
of liberties felt to be essential by modern men and women. Judicial con-
structs of fairly recent vintage, they are designed to protect the individual
in the context of all-encompassing and constantly encroaching govern-
mental interference. As Bernard Schwartz writes in his Commentary on
the Constitution, the Framers included the Fourth Amendment to pro-
tect our privacy, but today "the serious dangers in this country are not of
the type against which the Fourth Amendment was directed ... but from
less invidious encroachments upon the inner self. ."91 One of these is
the invasion by government of private life to such an extent that a constantly
diminishing area of privacy is left to the individual.
4. Church and State. The Court avoided several very difficult issues in
its opinion, undoubtedly as a matter of conscious strategy. One of the
most obvius evasions was that of an unconstitutional church-state re-
lationship. The Catholic Church opposes abortion as immoral. On the
other hand, many individuals and religious groups in this country feel that
terminating the development of the embryo at an early stage does not
involve a moral problem, or certainly not one of the caliber presented
" Roe v. Wade, 93 S.Ct. at 733-4 (Stewart, J., concurring).
89 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
90 Poe v. UlIman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
91 B. SCHWARTZ, RIGHTS OF THE PERSON 253 (1968).
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by the birth of unwanted, unloved, children or by some of the other side
effects of unwanted pregnancies. There is thus a division of opinion be-
tween those who believe the issue presents a moral problem and those
who believe that it does not.
For the Court to decide or to support Texas' decision that the de-
veloping embryo was "life" and that the existence and value of this life
was to be valued over the mother's interests might have involved the
Court in "establishment" or "freedom of religion" problems, although
the Court is careful to avoid a direct statement of this issue. The Court
did touch on the rights of the pregnant woman, however:
In view of all this, we do not agree that, by adopting one theory of
life, Texas may override the rights of the pregnant woman that
are now at stake. 2
Epperson v. Arkansas,93 decided in 1968, had held that a state might not
adopt one theologically-based view of the evolution of man and prohibit
the teaching of other views in its public schools. Government must be
neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine and practice. The Court
stressed the following points about the First Amendment:
[The First Amendment] ... forbids alike the preference of a
religious doctrine or the prohibition of theory which is deemed
antagonistic to a particular dogma. As Mr. Justice Clark stated
in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, "the state has no legitimate
interest in protecting any or all religions from views distasteful
to them .... 94
The reasoning in Roe, not spelled out explicitly, seems to be that for the
state to decide that immediately after conception the embryo constitutes
actual human life, and to protect it without additional statement of a com-
pelling state interest, would, in effect, be to adopt a theologically-based
ethical standard with which many, perhaps a majority of the citizens,
do not agree. As in the Arkansas case, where the only state reason for
forbidding the teaching of evolution was religious and no substantial state
interest other than this was advanced, the law is open to challenge on
grounds of religious neutrality. Though this is not dealt with overtly, the
Roman Catholic Church's insistent support of the sanctity of early fetal
life and its heavy lobbying efforts in state legislatures may have made the
Court wary of upholding a "right to life" view not supported either by
history, precedent, or by a strong statement of tangible state interests.
5. Medical emphasis of the opinion. Throughout the majority opinion there
is an emphasis on medical factors. The "viability" distinction, which
92 Roe v. Wade, 93 S.Ct. at 731.
93 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
" 
41d., at 106-7.
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supplies the dividing line between permissible and impermissible abortions,
is based on medical knowledge and technique. The woman's health and
welfare, as evaluated by her physician, must supply the excuse for an
abortion. The Court does not support "abortion on demand," or abortion
for economic reasons. A woman's desire for an abortion for frivolous
reasons (that she wants a fur coat instead of a baby, or that having a baby
would spoil her trip to Gstaad) would not be sufficiently substantial to
outweigh the legislative valuing of embryonic life over the mother's in-
terests. A decision based on the mother's health and welfare and made in
consultation with her doctor has a different weight. The abortion decision,
in essence, must be a medical decision, and in summarizing the Court's
holding in Roe v. Wade, Justice Blackmun states that:
The decision vindicates the right of the physician to administer
medical treatment according to his professional judgment up to
the points where important state interests provide compelling jus-
tifications for intervention. Up to those points the abortion decision
in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily a medical decision
and basic responsibility for it must rest with the physician. If an
individual practitioner abuses the privilege of exercising proper
medical judgment, the usual remedies, judicial and intra-professional,
are available. '-5
In some ways he almost seems to be appealing to the medical profession
to supply the authority which he cannot find in the lawbooks.
There are, in addition, an unusually large number of references to
physicians and medical matters in the two opinions. The discussion of
the Hippocratic oath, interesting though it is, is probably unnecessary
to the opinion. There are sections of Roe v. Wade which canvass the views
of the American Medical Association and the American Public Health
Association on abortion. When the appellants in Doe v. Bolton criticize
the bureaucratic routines required by the Georgia law because they fear
that these procedures will allow physicians to decide against abortions
on subjective grounds (e.g. disapproval of premarital sex), Justice Black-
mun rises to the defense of the medical profession. He takes this occasion
to express his admiration and confidence in the objectivity, good judgment,
high principles, love of humanity and integrity of medical men:
The appellants suggestion is necessarily somewhat degrading to
the conscientious physician, particularly to the obstetrician, whose
professional activity is concerned with the physical and mental
welfare, the woes, the emotions, and the concern for his female
9' Roe v. Wade, 93 S.Ct. at 733 (my italics).
28
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 2 [1974], Art. 6
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol5/iss2/6
THE ABORTION CASES
patients. He, perhaps more than anyone else, is knowledgeable
in this area of patient care, and he is aware of human frailty, so-
called "error," and needs. The good physician--despite the presence
of rascals in the medical profession, as in all others, we trust that
most physicians are "good"-will have a sympathy and an under-
standing for the pregnant patient that probably is not exceeded
by those who participate in other areas of professional counseling."6
It is hard to see what the function of this encomium might be, except per-
haps to import some of the authority on medical matters which physicians
command ("Doctors do . . .", as the television commercial has it) to
substitute for the lack of legal authority. However, this emphasis on
doctors' integrity and the medical nature of abortion has the salutory ef-
fect of taking the abortion decision, at least when made early in pregnancy,
out of the realm of morality and supporting it as a decision which is pri-
marily medical. There is no reason why it should not be made, as decisions
to perform other operations are by doctors, without the help of government.
6. Criticism of the viability distinction. In many ways the Court's decision
to use "viability" as the key to solution of the abortion dispute was a
compromise. It allowed some abortions, under the most favorable con-
ditions, and sustained the right to life of the developing child at the stage
when it had achieved some chance of survival. But the compromise did
not please either extreme among the disputants. The Roman Catholic
Church insisted that the fetus was indeed a human being and denied the
morality of taking any human life. :1 7 The women's groups and some others
declared that governmental manipulation of the individual's reproductive
life was totally reprehensible, and that both "compulsory pregnancy"
and compulsory sterilization laws involved state interference in what shouid
be completely a matter of private decision. Since they felt that there was
not justification for state regulation of any kind, Justice Blackmun's di-
vision of the pregnancy into trimesters, with the state's interest becoming
significant when the fetus became "viable," was unacceptable. Among
other things, Blackmun's distinction involved a doctrine of "contingent
constitutionality," where the woman has a right to choose only until a
certain point in time; after that "the woman and her fetus revert to state
ownership.""' The viability distinction also had the objectionable result
of tying the woman's rights to the current state of science and medicine:
... viability is usually defined, quite cavalierly and imprecisely,
as the capacity of the fetus to survive outside the woman's body.
For how long? With what heroic medical assistance and devices?
Recent developments in technology now permit fetal surgery (not
*6 Doe v. Bolton, 93 S.Ct. at 750.
.7 Drinan, The Inviolability of the Right to be Born, in ABORTION AND THE LAW 107-
23 (1967).
98 Cisler, supra note 13, at 273.
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always on wanted fetuses) and will soon permit inovulation-the
removal of a fertilized egg or of a fetus from one woman and its
implantation in another-and even extrauterine gestation. How soon
will it be before a twelve-week-old, or a one-week old, fetus can
be considered viable? Women's right to abort cannot hinge on the
state of technology, and we are left with the inescapable conclusion
that the only event in the sequence of pregnancy that can be assigned
a specific time is birth itself, at the time that it occurs. All else is
mystique and conjecture.!'!
This is approximately what Chief Justice Burger said in another context,
in Eisenstadt v. Baird, namely that "The commands of the Constitution
cannot fluctuate with the shifting tides of scientific opinion."' 10 0
7. Avoiding the social issues and deference to the legislature. Many of
the real issues in this case never surface, as the Court struggles to dis-
pose of the controversy on purely legal and constitutional rather than on
policy grounds. But the almost complete failure to mention issues of pol-
icy gives the opinion and some of the dissents a feeling of unreality. We
never read, for instance, that illegal abortions are performed each year
by the hundreds of thousands, for this is legally irrelevant to the case.
It is in the area of social policy, of course, that the legislature can
weigh and measure alternatives and the courts cannot-how is potential
life to be balanced against the imperatives of population control, the de-
pletion of resources, the child's right to decent care? The one social is-
sue which emerges, though couched in legal terms, is the woman's right
to have her rights considered in the regulation of abortion. Since it is pos-
sible at this time in history to have a safe, early abortion, why should
she be forced by law to risk her life and sacrifice her interests when those
interests are opposed to the bearing of a child? Why should she not have
the right to decide (although this is very cautiously stated in terms of health),
since she bears so great a proportion of the risks and burdens of parent-
hood, whether it is a good idea to bring a particular baby to term at a par-
ticular time?
Justices White and Rehnquist, in dissent, suggest that in controversies
of this type, where there is no clear constitutional command, the courts
should defer "to the people and to the political processes the people have
devised to govern their affairs." 10 1 What would have been the results
of deferring to state legislatures on this matter? If the Court had refused
to decide these cases on privacy or due process grounds, undoubtedly
challenges would have been brought under some of the other constitu-
tional phrases and clauses. A good case could have been made under the
99 Id., at 273-4.
100 405 U.S. 438, 470 (1972).
101 Roe v. Wade, 93 S.Ct. at 763 (White, J., dissenting).
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Equal Protection clause, showing both that abortion laws are inherently
discriminatory, having an unequal impact on women, and that they in
effect deny abortions to poor women. One of the lawyers in the New York
case, Abramowicz v. Lefkowitz, prepared a brief arguing that since simple
abortion procedures are medically possible, forcing a woman to bear the
pains and risks of motherhood against her will by a criminal abortion law
discriminates against her, and since pregnancy and the status of motherhood,
especially when unmarried, carries many legal disabilities, then depriving
the woman of her ability to choose involves an invasion of her Fourteenth
Amendment rights. ' 0 2
Recent lower court cases overturning sex discrimination in jury duty' 0 3
and differential punishment for men and women, 10 4 as well as the recent
Supreme Court decision of sex discrimination in the armed services,l0 5 lay
a basis for challenges along these lines.
Other possible challenges suggested in briefs and law review articles
indicate that failure to take jurisdiction, or rejection of the right to privacy
arguments in favor of deference to the legislature, would not have ended
judicial involvement with abortion. There were other arguments: some of
them raising much clearer constitutional claims. The separation of church
and state challenge, especially in view of intense lobbying against legal-
ization of abortion by the Roman Catholic Church, might form the basis
for a fruitful lawsuit in those states where the legislature had clearly been
subjected to a high pressure campaign. The argument here would be that
criminalization of abortion, rather than its regulation, reflects a theological
position rather than a rational social policy decision. Certainly, many
legislatures would weigh the policy alternatives differently if some of the
extreme emotionalism generated by the Right to Life forces were removed,
and more information on related social values considered in a neutral
setting.
The point here is that deference to the legislature in Roe and in Doe prob-
ably would not have kept abortion cases from appearing on court dockets.
One has only to look back at Colegrove v. Green10 6 and Poe v. Ullman10 7
to see the futility of trying to avoid a clear determination of constitutional
rights on an issue that is pushing so strongly for judicial settlement. The
fact that legislatures are generally more competent than courts to weigh
102 Stearns, Abortion Brief, reprinted in RADICAL LAWYERS 264 (J. Black ed., 1971).
See also "Plaintiffs Brief," in Schulder and Kennedy, supra note 36, at 208.
103 White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401 (1966).
104 U.S. ex rel. Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 955 (1968).
105 Frontiero v. Richardson, 93 S.Ct. 1764 (1973).
106 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
107 367 U.S. 497 (1961). In Colegrove the Court tried to avoid meeting the issue of leg-
islative reapportionment, but only succeeded in delaying a solution for over a decade; in
Poe, it turned away litigation on the Connecticut birth control statute on an issue of standing,
but was forced to decide the case in another form in Griswold, in 1965.
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and to measure social costs and benefits does not mean that they always
do the job entrusted to them. The history of abortion legislation has often
shown that judicial trumpetings about legislative expertise can be a legal
fiction.
Some in depth studies of legislative deliberations reveal the shortcomings
of legislative handling of particular problems. A case study of the passage
of the Georgia law which was challenged in Doe v. Bolton shows that
instead of being a careful weighing of competing interests, the legislature
was primarily concerned with two very narrow aspects of the abortion
picture: (a) the protection of doctors from prosecution and (b) a desire
that any abortion laws on the statute books be extremely rigorous in al-
lowing as few abortions as possible in order to forestall the possibility
of Georgia becoming an abortion mill.' 0 8
The Georgia abortion reform bill did not even begin as a reform pro-
posal, but was part of the revision of the state's criminal code. That code
provided as an "affirmative defense" in prosecutions of doctors for abor-
tion, the defense that the abortion had been performed in response to
certain extraordinary circumstances (to protect the life of the mother,
to prevent deformity or following a rape). The bill tried to simplify the
law by exempting certain abortions from the general criminal prohibition,
thus keeping the doctors from having to go to court and defend against
prosecutions, if they performed these abortions. The bill was treated
throughout its legislative history as a bill to protect physicians, and many
of the exquisitely restrictive safeguards in it were designed to keep this
"protection" from becoming a "license" to perform abortions. Since the
bill was not primarily an abortion bill, women's groups were not alerted
nor represented in the process at all, nor were their interests presented
in any direct form. A study of the legislative process showed the fol-
lowing:
The origin of the bill and its defense throughout its course-whether
in informal or public hearings, on the floor of one of the two houses
of the legislature, or in committee-was primarily aimed at protecting
doctors who at some time, and for any of a variety of reasons,
might feel the performance of an abortion was necessary. The health,
happiness, comfort and convenience of the prospective abortee
were rarely injected into the debate.'"
In other words, the weighing of competing interests was done very poorly
by the Georgia legislature, because some of the interests were not even
represented in the legislative process. Naturally these interests might
feel, later, that as individuals, they had a right to fight for recognition
of their rights in the courts. Church groups, lawyers, and physicians had
108 S. JAIN & L. GOOCH, GEORGIA ABORTION ACT 1968: A STUDY IN LEGISLATIVE
PROCESS (1972).
109 Id. at 62.
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worked out the solution which was finally adopted. Women, not represented
in the legislative process, took their case to the courts:
All that this probably means is that in times when law lags behind
social change, all governmental institutions are likely to be pressed into
service to help solve the conflicts. Legislatures are the most open to in-
puts of all kinds, factual, political, representational; they are also likely
to be dominated by the best organized and well-funded groups on one
side of an issue, and may be as out of touch with long-term changes
taking place in society as the courts are. While the courts have the
disadvantage of having to consider issues in a narrow context of court-
room procedure, the adversary system, and existing laws and con-
stitutional provisions, they have the advantage of being removed from
immediate pressures, and can often see the relation of legal principles
to the social problems presented in individual lawsuits. Deference to
the legislature is certainly always wise; but just as Justice Stone's warning
in United States v. Butler that "Courts are not the only agency of govern-
ment that must be assumed to have the capacity to govern,"' 110 cautioned
against an excess of reliance on the judicial branch, the same must be said
of other branches also. Each branch has its deficiencies as well as its
strengths and our system of separation of powers demands that each
act as a corrective force.
Impact
A Supreme Court decision is hardly ever the end of a dispute. Pos-
sibly when it involves an individual's income tax or the question of whether
a prisoner was or was not given a fair trial, the Court's answer may be
final, though even here the fact that an individual dispute is heard at all
probably means that it reflects deeper and broader consequences and
is merely representative of these.
Jane Roe, a divorced waitress, and Mary Doe, an Atlanta house-
wife, helped develop a new constitutional principle: that because of
the serious impact of unwanted pregnancies on individual women, the
states might not preclude the abortion alternative altogether without de-
priving them of their liberty or privacy. But this decision was hardly
announced before political pressures to use alternative means to reverse
and to limit it began to be felt. Individuals and groups dissatisfied with the
decision began to search for ways of attacking it in other forums.
Predictably, the Roman Catholic reaction was violent. In a pastoral
message issued February 13th, 1973, Roman Catholic bishops called for
civil disobedience of any law requiring abortion."' In no other situation
110 297 U.S. 1, 87 (1936).
"I Heyer, Catholic Bishops Urged Defiance of Any Law Requiring Abortion, Wash.
Post, Feb. 14, 1973.
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in recent times has the hierarchy felt that other moral issues outweighed
the obligation to obey the law."' The Church was worried that this de-
cision might lead to laws requiring Catholic doctors or hospitals to per-
form abortions. According to Commonweal, a bill in the Oregon legis-
lature would require all hospitals to admit patients for abortions, and a
bill in Wisconsin threatened loss of license to individual doctors who re-
fused to perform abortions. 113 Of course proposed legislation often puts
forward plans which are never passed into law, but these prospects fright-
ened Catholics. In Congress, Senator Frank Church of Idaho moved to
protect Catholic hospitals against loss of funds under the Hill-Burton
Act by introducing a resolution (S.J.R. 64) which would protect hospi-
tals from performing operations which violated religious beliefs. 1 4
The Catholic hierarchy reaffirmed its position that any person who
underwent an abortion would be subject to excommunication. 1 5 The
bishops also urged Catholics to use all means possible to reverse the de-
cision. A citizen's group in Virginia suggested that Justice William Bren-
nan, the Court's only Catholic Justice and a member of the majority, be
excommunicated. 116
Catholic and Right to Life (mostly Catholic) forces which had been
active in opposing the modernization of abortion laws in state legislatures,
now urged the states to block the Court's decision in any way possible.
Legislatures in fifteen states were prevailed upon to introduce resolutions
which would give the fetus constitutional rights.' 1 7 The Rhode Island
legislature ultimately adopted an abortion statute declaring that human
life begins at the moment of conception and that such life is a "person"
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment."" By May 1973, fifty
resolutions had been introduced in twenty state legislatures; all of these
were designed to permit hospitals to refuse to perform abortions, or other-
wise to put obstacles in the way of women wishing to have the operation. I"
In Nebraska, legislators began to work on a law which would tie up abor-
tions during the second trimester with tight restrictions, and require that
the names of all persons having abortions be reported. 120 In Louisiana,
112 Id.
113 Abortion: Next Round, COMMONWEAL, Mar. 23, 1973, at 51-2.
14 Id.
115 Heyer, supra note Ill.
"'1 TIME, Feb. 5, 1973, at 51.
"17 N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1973, at I.
"8 Doe v. Israel (decided May 16, 1973). A federal District Court for the District of
Rhode Island ruled this law invalid in May, 1973, holding that a state cannot legislate a
presumption that violates the constitutional rights of persons affected and that the State has
no right to determine who is a "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
"' Randal, Anti-Abortion Forces Fight Court Decision, Raleigh News and Observer,
May 13, 1973.
120 Brody, States and Doctors Wary on Eased Abortion Ruling, N.Y. Times, Feb.
16, 1973, at 46.
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state authorities refused to accept the Court's ruling and promised a long
fight before complying. The State Attorney General said that the state
still had authority to revoke a doctor's license for performing an abortion. 2 1
As we learned during the aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education,
there are many ways in which implementation of a controversial Supreme
Court decision may be delayed or avoided. There was a great deal of un-
certainty as to the exact scope and meaning of the Court's decision in
Roe v. Wade. Was any regulation to be allowed in the first trimester of
pregnancy? Certainly the state could require that abortions be performed
only by licensed practitioners. Could it also require that they be performed
in hospitals, rather than in clinics or doctors' offices? Since hospitals
in many states are crowded, the requirement that abortions be performed
in hospitals might make them more costly and difficult to obtain--only
those patients who could reserve beds and operating facilities would be
served, and a hospital abortion could end up being as expensive as a nor-
mal delivery. If clinics or doctors' offices could be used, what might the
state require in the way of preoperative examinations and evaluations,
emotional and contraceptive counseling, inspection, record keeping, re-
porting or other procedures? All of these uncertainties could be exploited
by opponents of the abortion decision.
It was not surprising that some hospitals decided to wait until guide-
lines were more clearly marked out before opening their doors to abortion
patients. Breckenridge Hospital in Austin, Texas, refused to allow abor-
tions even though it had favorable rulings both by the United States Su-
preme Court and from the State Attorney General; it wanted a ruling from
the City Attorney in Austin to be certain.122 At least one judge decided
that he would not be in the forefront of change; ten days after the Roe
ruling, a state court in Cook County, Illinois, issued a restraining order
blocking three physicians from performing thirty abortions. 1 23 Doctors
themselves would have a good deal to say about the manner in which a
given state would comply with the new ruling. It seemed clear that pro-
fessional regulations might replace official state standards in some areas.
This had happened in Maryland when the legislature failed by one vote
to pass a new abortion law, leaving the state, in the opinion of the Mary-
land Attorney General, with no laws on the subject. The Maryland med-
ical society stepped in and began to draw up a comprehensive set of guide-
lines; it could enforce these standards by revoking the licenses of non-
cooperating doctors. 1 24 Where medical leaders shared the views of anti-
abortion groups, they would probably be able to delay the implementation
of more lenient procedures. Even where they were not opposed to abortion,
121 Id.
122 N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1973, at 46.
123 Id.
124 Huth, Maryland Doctors Draft Abortion Standards, Wash. Post, Apr. 27, 1973.
35
Rubin: The Abortion Cases: A Study in Law and Social Change
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1974
NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
the medical profession might act as a conservative force to keep change
from taking place very rapidly. Abortion counseling services in the states,
noting the reluctance of doctors and hospitals to change their policies,
were still sending their clients to well-established contacts in New York
and Washington. 125
Not all states set about trying to circumvent the Supreme Court de-
cision. Some states moved to conform their laws to the new ruling. North
Carolina revised its abortion statute along lines suggested in the decision.
Maryland failed by one vote to do the same, possibly because anti-abortion
forces added some complicating amendments.12 6 In all, nine states in-
troduced new legislation to bring their laws into conformity with the de-
cision. Nine more were working on new legislation by the middle of Feb-
ruary. 127 In twelve states the Attorney General had declared existing
laws null and void, and in several others Attorneys General were waiting
for the legislature or courts to act. Only Virginia and Maryland had re-
jected a bill which would have brought their laws into line with the Court's
ruling. 128
In addition to action in state legislatures, there were a number of pro-
posed Constitutional Amendments introduced in Congress. These took
several forms. One type would hand the regulation of abortions back to
the states. Another type flatly prohibited abortion after the moment of
conception. 129 In the end of May, six United States Senators backed
a "Human-Life Amendment," sponsored by Senator James L. Buckley
(R., N.Y.), which would prohibit abortions except where the mother's
life was endangered. Buckley's amendment took the form of extending the
category of "person" to all "human beings including their unborn off-
spring at every stage of their biological development irrespective of age,
health, function or condition of dependency.' 130 According to Buckley,
his amendment would also protect against mercy killing.
The Supreme Court itself still had loose ends to tie up in the abortion
cases. Several weeks after the decisions in Roe and Doe, the Court sent
nine state challenges back to lower courts for action along the lines it
had delineated. These cases were pending when the decision was handed
down, and they involved challenges to laws in Connecticut, Missouri,
Illinois, North Carolina, Utah, Kentucky, Ohio and South Carolina. a1 3
In February, the Court refused to reconsider its January ruling, 132 and
125 N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1973, at 46.
126 Walsh, Abortion Bill Fails by I Vote, Wash. Post, Apr. 3, 1973.
127 N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1973, at 1.
128 Id. See also Walsh, supra note 126.
'29 Russell, Anti-Abortion Measures Grow, Wash. Post, June 1, 1973.
130 Six Senators Propose Amendment that Would Ban Most Abortions, Chapel Hill
Newspaper, May 31, 1973.
"3I Decision Ordered on Abortion Laws, Raleigh News and Observer, Feb. 27, 1973.
132 FACTS ON FILE, Feb. 26, 1973, 190 C 2.
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later dismissed without a hearing a suit arguing that the fetus has a right
to life as involving no "substantial federal question.' 1 33 In April the
Court denied rehearings to groups in New York and Connecticut who
claimed they had found new evidence concerning the exact time when
the life of a fetus begins. 134 In June, the Court set aside a District Court
ruling that gave indigent women in New York state a constitutional right to
abortion at federal (Medicaid) expense, sending the ruling back for recon-
sideration in light of its January guidelines.' 3 5 This action may have re-
flected the Court's unwillingness to protect any right to a non-medical
abortion.
In spite of objections to the limiting aspects of the opinion in Roe v.
Wade, women's rights groups greeted the Court's decision with elation.
It was the most far-reaching constitutional and legal step for women since
they had gained the right to vote. 136 Women congratulated themselves
on having had a great deal to do with producing this favorable decision.
The teach-ins, speak-outs, picket lines, demonstrations, lobbying and
class-action suits had paid off handsomely. The secret to success had been
the change from the futility of ladylike lobbying efforts in legislative com-
mittee rooms to dramatic, direct-action tactics which demonstrated the
strength of public opinion in favor of legal change and also helped give
women, singly and in groups, courage to bring the problem out into the
open.1 3
7
There were a number of other side effects resulting from the decision.
There had already been concern about the use of fetuses for medical re-
search, and this concern was heightened by the prospect of a larger number
of abortions. Although fetuses from abortions performed in the United
States have rarely been used, researchers have gone to other countries,
Finland for example, to experiment on fetuses obtained there. After the
Supreme Court's decision, the National Institutes of Health began to
work on guidelines which would limit the kinds of research possible on
live, aborted fetuses. These included the forbidding of research on viable
fetuses, or any of a certain size, or the keeping of a fetus alive by artificial
means, for experimentation.1 38 The fear that aborted fetuses would be
subject to improper experimentation, as well as distaste at the very idea
of experimentation, led Congress to accept as a rider to a federally-funded
medical research bill the proviso that no funds would be used for any
,33 Id. See Byrn v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp. (appeal dismissed)
73 S.Ct. 1414 (1973).
134 FACTS ON FILE, Apr. 16, 1973, 314 B 3.
135 Mackensie, Court Limits Right to Abortion, Wash. Post, June 5, 1973.
136 Mutnick & La Mont, The Meaning of the Supreme Court Decision, WONAAC
(Women's National Abortion Action Coalition) Newsletter, Feb.-Mar., 1973, at 3.
131 WONAAC Newsletter, Feb.-Mar., 1973, at 6. This newsletter is published in New
York City.
'31 Cohn, Scientists and Fetus Research, Wash. Post, Apr. 15, 1973.
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research on a live fetus.' 39
Other dimensions of the impact of this decision were not immediately
evident. It was impossible to tell how many abortions would now take
place or what effect they might have on population growth, feminine health,
the number of babies available for adoption, or other matters. It was,
however, interesting to note that some of the Eastern European coun-
tries which had allowed abortion on demand were reinstituting controls
because of a declining birth rate and because medical evidence seemed
to indicate that previous abortions caused some women to deliver pre-
maturely when they later decided to have children. Although obviously
there exists a different situation with sparsely populated Bulgaria than
with more populous nations, that Eastern European country had recently
put restrictions on its liberal abortion policy, allowing abortions only
within the first ten weeks, to women with two or more children, or un-
married women under 18. Over 18, unmarried women would not be allowed
to terminate a pregnancy except for grave illness.'1 4 Romania had also
recently changed its abortion laws, instituting a more restrictive policy.
In Yugoslavia and Hungary, liberal abortion policies were causing abor-
tions to outnumber live births. In Czechoslovakia, Poland and Bulgaria
there was only a slight percentage of live births over abortions.141 In many
of these countries, however, birth control methods other than abortion
were non-existent.
Another country, Japan, was beginning to worry about the 700,000
abortions performed annually for "economic reasons," though this worry
seemed to stem from a fear of a worker shortage. The Japanese population
was still growing in spite of the large numbers of abortions. In Japan, as
in Eastern Europe, abortion frequently took the place of other birth
control measures, which were not readily available. In Japan, also, the
government had certain policy objectives; its goal was "stabilizing the
net reproduction of females" to one daughter per mother.' 42
In the United States, even before the Supreme Court's decision had
any impact, the birth rate seemed to be slowing, with both birth and fer-
tility rates dropping to a new low. The drop seemed to be substantially
the result of the lower fertility rates, births per thousand women in the 15-44
age group. Population stabilization due to this factor was undependable,
however, because these women might decide, unpredictably, to have
more babies at any time. Nor were population totals at a complete stand-
still, in spite of the falling off of the birth rate; an estimated current pop-
ulation of 208.7 million was due to reach 251-300 million by the year 2000.'4
"9. Lyons, President Rebuffed on Health, Wash. Post, July 1, 1973.
140 Morgan, Bulgaria Restricts Abortions, Wash. Post, May 5, 1973.
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The full impact of the Supreme Court's decision was yet to be felt.
Strong Roman Catholic opposition could still keep a liberal abortion policy
from being implemented on a practical level. The effect on the birth rate
and other social effects would not be felt for several years. Closing the
gap between practice and legal rules could only have good effects in so
far as respect for the law, the burdens on law enforcement officers, and
the decline in illegal operations were involved. It seems likely, however,
that on an issue such as this, in which complex and controversial questions
of public and private morality, religious conviction and constitutional
rights are bound up with far-reaching legal and political considerations,
it will be some time before the returns are all in.
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